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Digest:  People v. Nguyen 
Meagan S. Tom 
Opinion by Baxter, J. with George, C.J., Werdegard, J., Chin, 
J., Moreno, J. and Corrigan, J. concurring.  Dissenting Opinion 
by Kennard, J. 
Issue 
Does the United States Constitution allow the use of prior 
juvenile adjudication to increase sentences under the Three 
Strikes law even though there is no right to a jury trial in 
juvenile proceedings? 
Facts 
In an amended complaint, defendant Vince Vinhtuang 
Nguyen was charged in December 2004 with four felony counts.1  
For sentencing purposes, the amended complaint also alleged 
that the defendant had a qualifying “prior felony conviction” 
under the Three Strikes Law, a 1999 juvenile adjudication for 
assault with a deadly weapon.2 
Defendant pled no contest to one felony, possession of a 
firearm by an ex-felon, and a misdemeanor, possession of a billy3 
on March 2005 pursuant to a plea agreement.4  Defendant had 
also waived his statutory right to a jury trial to determine 
whether he had suffered a qualifying prior felony conviction, i.e. 
the 1999 juvenile adjudication.5  The trial court decided that the 
strike allegation was true based upon documentary evidence and 
noted that the court file regarding the 1999 juvenile matter 
indicated that defendant admitted to the violation.6 
 1 People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 949 (Cal. 2009).  Defendant was charged with of 
possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, possession of ammunition by an ex-felon, 
possession of a billy, and possession of methamphetamine. Id.  Defendant was also 
charged with two misdemeanors: being under the influence of a controlled substance and 
possession drug paraphernalia. Id. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Possession of a billy could be charged and/or convicted as either a felony or a 
misdemeanor. Id. at n.3. 
 4 Id. at 949.  In exchange for the guilty plea, the other counts were dismissed. Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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Defendant objected to the trial court’s use of the prior 
juvenile proceeding as a strike in the current case, in violation of 
his Sixth Amendment rights, since the juvenile adjudication had 
no right to a jury trial.7  The trial court rejected this argument 
and sentenced defendant to 16 months for the firearm possession 
conviction, doubled to 32 months based upon the previous 
qualifying strike.8 
Defendant appealed, raising the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing issue.  In the first opinion, the Court of Appeal upheld 
the trial court’s sentence, stating that while the Sixth 
amendment forbids the use of contested juvenile adjudications 
for enhanced sentencing in a subsequent adult offense, since the 
defendant had admitted that he had committed the violation in 
the juvenile case, the current sentence was not affected by the 
lack of a jury trial.9  On rehearing, the Court of Appeal reversed, 
stating that since minors tried for criminal offenses have no right 
to jury trial, “the use of any juvenile adjudications as prior 
convictions to enhance subsequent adult sentences is prohibited 
by the Sixth Amendment.”10  The Supreme Court of California 
granted review. 
Analysis 
The United States Supreme Court has established that an 
adult criminal defendant has a general right under the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to a jury trial finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact that increases the sentence 
for a felony conviction that goes beyond the maximum term 
permitted by conviction of the charged offense alone.11  Apprendi 
found that the Sixth Amendment adopted the common law 
tradition that any fact that is crucial to the maximum 
punishment for an offense is considered an “element” of the 
offense and subject to the same requirements of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt and a jury trial.12 
Under California’s Three Strikes Law,13 the complaint 
against a defendant can, for the purposes of sentencing 
enhancement, charge that defendant had previously had a 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 949–50. 
 9 Id. at 950. 
 10 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 11 Id. at 947 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Oregon v. Ice 129 
S.Ct. 711 (2009); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296 (2004)). 
 12 Id. (citing Apprendi). 
 13 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)–(i), 1170.12(a)–(d) (West 2009). 
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juvenile adjudication qualifying as a prior felony conviction.14  
The Three Strikes Law statutorily affords an adult criminal 
defendant the right to a jury trial whether he or she has suffered 
an alleged conviction.15  Here, Defendant had waived his right to 
a jury trial regarding the alleged conviction and the trial court 
determined he had suffered a qualifying conviction based upon 
documentary evidence.16  Under Apprendi, any fact “that allows 
enhancement of an adult defendant’s maximum sentence for the 
current offense must, unless the defendant waives his jury-trial 
right, be determined by a jury in the current case.”17  The court 
found that the statutory process under the Three Strikes Law 
complies with the Apprendi rule.18 
However, defendant argued that he qualifies for the prior 
conviction exception19 under the Apprendi rule, stating that 
regardless of the jury trial rights in the current case, the lack of 
jury trial in the juvenile proceeding excludes all use of the 
resulting adjudication to enhance sentencing in the current 
case.20  The court rejected this argument, stating that Apprendi 
does not preclude the sentence-enhancing use of a prior valid, 
fair, and reliable adjudication against an adult felon, because the 
defendants had all the constitutional protections afforded, even 
though it does not include the right to jury trial in previous 
juvenile adjudication.21  The court found it logically incompatible 
to conclude that a constitutionally decided juvenile adjudication 
that justified confinement of a juvenile, would be considered 
“constitutionally inadequate” when used at a later date to 
 14 People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 948 (Cal. 2009). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 950 (emphasis in original). 
 18 Id. at 951. 
 19 The prior conviction exception arose out of a pre-Apprendi case, Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Id.  In Almendarez-Torres, the court found 
that the Constitution did not require treatment of prior convictions as an element of the 
current criminal offense and therefore did not need to be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. (citation omitted). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 953.  The United States Supreme Court has previously held that minor 
criminal defendants, who may be confined in a correctional institution are 
constitutionally entitled to nearly all the same procedural rights and protections as adult 
criminal defendants, except for the right to a jury trial. Id. (citations omitted).  The Court 
discusses McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the 1971 United States Supreme Court decision 
which found that there was no constitutional jury trial right in juvenile proceedings, 
stating that it reflected the concern that the introduction of juries would interfere too 
greatly with the effort to deal with youthful offenders in a less formal and adversarial 
setting, echoing society's preference for protective and rehabilitative proceedings instead. 
Id. at 956 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–51 (1971)). 
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establish an individual’s recidivism in order to enhance adult 
offense sentencing.22 
The court further stated that all California Court of Appeal 
panels have previously held that the issue of juvenile convictions 
being used to enhance sentencing for adult offenses does not 
violate the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, even 
though there is no jury trial right.23  Since the juvenile 
adjudication is being used to show the recidivism of the now 
adult defendant the court found that it was a highly rational 
basis for enhancing an adult’s sentence.24  The court stated that 
recidivism after the juvenile adjudication was even more 
compelling reason for enhancing sentencing,  since he had been 
previously found to have committed criminal conduct and did not 
reform, despite the state’s previous interventions.25 
The court also pointed out that the majority of federal 
decisions and other states’ decisions have also reached a similar 
conclusion after the Apprendi decision, determining that nonjury 
juvenile adjudications can be used to enhance later adult 
sentences, and its’ ruling is consistent with these other 
decisions.26 
Holding 
The court held that the use of prior juvenile adjudication to 
increase a defendant’s sentence under the Three Strikes law does 
not violate the right to a jury trial.27 
Dissent 
Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that under 
California’s Three Strikes law that the existence of a prior 
juvenile court adjudication of criminal conduct triggers increased 
punishment.28  However, Justice Kennard interpreted Apprendi 
to extend not only to the “fact” of the existence of a prior 
adjudication, but also requiring a jury trial on the conduct that 
led to that adjudication.29  Justice Kennard argued that the 
majority’s reasoning would “open[] the door to wholesale evasion 
or trivialization of the holding in Apprendi”30 and allow for 
 22 Id. at 955. 
 23 Id. at 954. 
 24 Id. at 956. 
 25 Id. at 957. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 961. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 962. 
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legislation to be enacted defining any sentence-increasing 
circumstance for the current offence in terms of prior court 
determinations or adjudication.31  Under this situation, a judge, 
not a jury, would determine if a specific aggravating 
circumstance had occurred, after which a jury would determine if 
a trial judge had actually made that specific factual 
determination; this was not the United States Supreme Court’s 
intention in Apprendi.32 
Justice Kennard also felt the decision of the court conflicted 
with its’ recent decision in People v. Towne, where it was held 
that a defendant’s sentence may not be increased based on a 
prior determination, in a nonjury revocation proceeding, of a 
probation or parole violation.33  The implied view in Towne, 
according to Justice Kennard, is that the constitutional right to a 
jury trial extends to both the conduct leading to the nonjury 
adjudication, not only the existence of it.34 
Justice Kennard also found that the lack of the right to a 
jury trial in juvenile proceedings, which the majority reasons 
could be constitutionally used in sentencing because they have 
been “reliably adjudicated in proceedings that included . . . every 
substantial safeguard . . . except the right to jury trial”35 
troubling.  It is the problem of having the facts of a juvenile court 
adjudication being determined by “a single employee of the 
state”36 rather than abiding by “the system envisioned by a 
Constitution that guarantees trial by jury.”37 
Legal Significance 
This ruling places California with the majority of other 
states and federal decisions, finding that juvenile adjudication 
could be used to enhance adult sentencing despite the denial of a 
right to a jury trial during the juvenile adjudication.  This ruling 
further affirms and situates the Apprendi rule within the current 
sentencing practices of the Three Strikes Law.  Nguyen also 
clarifies that in regards to sentencing, the right to a jury trial 
when determining an aggravating factors is required unless the 
defendant waives that right. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. (summarizing People v. Towne, 44 Cal.4th 63 (Cal. 2008)). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. (citing Apprendi). 
 37 Id. (citing Apprendi) (emphasis added by Kennard, J.). 
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